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Essay

Standing and the Precautionary Principle
Jonathan Remy Nash†
In Massachusetts v. EPA, the Supreme Court upheld Massachusetts’ standing
to challenge EPA’s refusal to regulate greenhouse gas emissions from mobile
sources.
The majority and dissent disputed whether the science of global
warming was sufficient to establish standing. Absent from both opinions was
discussion of whether there would be standing if the science were uncertain but
the potential harms large and irreversible.
This Essay argues that
“precautionary-based standing”—grounded upon a fundamental principle of
environmental law, the precautionary principle—should apply in such cases.
Precautionary-based standing would not upset existing standing doctrine.
First, its application would be limited, and could further be limited to cases
brought by a sovereign. Second, there already are less stringent standing
requirements in areas where society has deemed precaution to be appropriate.
Third, the catastrophic and uncertain nature of the injury in a precautionarybased standing would satisfy Article III.
The argument here is important in several ways. First, reliance upon the
precautionary principle might attract the support of people who question the
certainty of the science but recognize the large risks associated with global
warming. Second, precautionary-based standing would be available to address
future environmental crises where scientific understanding that the threat is real
may lag. Third, precautionary-based standing eventually may generate a broader
evolution of standing jurisprudence. Fourth, importation and application of the
precautionary principle to questions of standing will provide a logical and stable
setting in which the precautionary principle might develop and flourish.
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INTRODUCTION

In the heralded case of Massachusetts v. EPA,1 the United States Supreme Court
decided by a 5-4 vote that the state of Massachusetts had standing to challenge the
Environmental Protection Agency’s (“EPA”) refusal to regulate greenhouse gas
emissions from automobiles and other mobile sources.2 The majority grounded its
holding on EPA’s failure to challenge Massachusetts’ assertions about the likelihood, and
likely effects, of global warming. The majority accepted (at least for purposes of
determining the presence of standing) the plaintiffs’ allegations—that, as the majority
noted, were uncontested by EPA—that global warming was occurring as a result of
anthropogenic greenhouse gas emissions, and that Massachusetts would suffer harm as a
result. In effect, the majority accepted global warming and the risks associated with it as
a fact in rendering its decision on standing. A dissent authored by the Chief Justice
assailed the majority opinion, questioning whether the science of global warming was
sufficient to establish standing.3
Both the majority and dissent, then, disputed only whether the science underlying
the anthropogenic greenhouse effect was adequate to establish standing. Presumably, if
the majority agreed with the dissent that the science was lacking, it would have agreed
that there was no standing. Presumably, as well, had the dissenting Justices accepted the
science, they would have agreed that there was standing.
Notably absent from either the majority or dissenting opinion was explicit
discussion of how standing would be affected if, in fact, the science were uncertain but
the potential harms large and irreversible. It would seem that the dissenting Justices
would not think there was standing in such a case. The Justices in the majority seem
ultimately to dodge the question by simply noting that EPA did not contest the validity of
the underlying science.
In this Essay, I will argue that a fundamental principle of environmental law—the
precautionary principle—should inform the question left unanswered in the
Massachusetts case. The precautionary principle addresses situations such as this, and
explains that the absence of certainty in the face of a large risk does not justify inaction.
Application of the precautionary principle to the question of standing would suggest that
what I will call “precautionary-based standing” should apply in cases in which it can be
shown that there is uncertainty as to whether irreversible and catastrophic harms may
occur.

1

127 S. Ct. 1438 (2007).
The five-member majority also held that, contrary to the agency’s claim, the EPA did have the
authority so to act under the Clean Air Act, and that the agency’s explanation for why it had not exercised
its discretion to do so was inconsistent with the relevant legal standard. See id. at 1459-63.
3
Id. at 1463 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting). A separate dissent by Justice Scalia challenged the majority
opinion on the merits, see supra note 2, arguing that EPA did not have authority to regulate greenhouse gas
emissions and in any event justifiably exercised its discretion not to. See id. at 1471 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
2
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Precautionary-based standing would not upset the existing general law of
standing. First, precautionary-based standing would be limited, in that it would apply
only in cases in which there is uncertainty as to the occurrence of catastrophic,
irreversible harm. Precautionary-based standing could further be limited to cases brought
by sovereign states.4 Second, there is already authority in standing jurisprudence to
lessen the stringency of requirements of standing in other areas where society has deemed
precaution to be appropriate: the First Amendment and declaratory judgment actions.
Third, though not as imminent as typical injuries that give rise to standing, the
catastrophic nature of the injury—and the uncertainty with which the injury might
occur—in precautionary-based standing cases will be sufficient to satisfy Article III.
The argument I advance here is important in several ways. First, public reaction
to the Massachusetts decision has been mixed. Several newspapers have featured
editorials and op-ed pieces criticizing the Court’s reasoning.5 The failure of the Court to
address the question of precaution leaves the majority decision much more subject to
criticism. Reliance upon the precautionary principle might attract the support of people
who question the absolute certainty of the science but who recognize the large risks
associated with global warming in the event that the science is in fact correct.
Second, the use of the precautionary principle is important even to people who are
persuaded by the amount of scientific evidence of global warming and the number of
scientists who accept that evidence. Even if global warming is now at a point where
there is consensus, that was not always the case. The unavailability of precautionarybased standing has contributed to a delay, at least in terms of litigation of the issue. And,
of course, it is likely that there will be other environmental crises down the line that will
progress scientifically as did global warming, with more and more scientists coming
around—as science advances and evidence is gathered—to the view that the threat is real.
Application of the precautionary principle to standing thus will be important with respect
to environmental challenges that arise in the future.
Third, reliance upon the precautionary principle to determine standing need not be
limited to matters of environmental law. Environmental law has in recent years served to
push the envelope of federal court standing doctrine, but the developments in standing
jurisprudence that these environmental law cases have secured are not limited to
environmental law cases. Similarly, it may be that precautionary-based standing
eventually may generate a broader evolution of standing jurisprudence.
Fourth, importation and application of the precautionary principle to questions of
standing will provide a logical, and stable setting in which the precautionary principle
might develop and flourish. Many commentators have long lamented the lack of
certainty underlying the principle and how the principle should be applied. Some have
4

Indeed, the majority in the Massachusetts case suggested this possibility, without making good use of
special sovereign status; this reworking makes better use of the point than did the majority. See infra the
text accompanying notes 68-71.
5
See, e.g., Editorial, Jolly Green Justices, Wall St. J., Apr. 3, 2007, at A14; Editorial, Black Robes, Hot
Air, N.Y. POST, Apr. 4, 2007, at 28; Holman W. Jenkins, Jr., Op-Ed., Climate of Opinion, WALL ST. J.,
Apr. 4, 2007, at A14.
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asserted that the principle is inherently contradictory. Other commentators have
struggled to explain how the principle might be applied logically and coherently and legal
practice. Because the question of standing generally comes before merits questions, and
generally do not prejudice any ultimate determination on the merits, it stands to reason
that the use of the precautionary principle as a gatekeeper to the merits question is its
most logical role (at least preliminarily).
This Essay proceeds as follows. In Part I, I discuss the precautionary principle. I
elaborate upon the principle’s evolution and explain its various interpretations and
contradictions. In Part II, I provide an overview of federal court standing doctrine,
including the Court’s recent decision in the Massachusetts case.
In Part III, I argue for the inclusion of the precautionary principle in standing
jurisprudence. I begin by explaining how the precautionary-based standing would
operate. I then discuss why this incorporation is normatively desirable. I conclude that
the consideration of the precautionary principle in standing inquiries would benefit both
standing jurisprudence as well as the logical and coherent development of the
precautionary principle.
II.

THE PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE

The precautionary principle is a normative principle of environmental law.6 In its
essence, the precautionary principle calls for the exercise of caution7 in the face of risk
and uncertainty.8 While the principle can be applied in any setting in which risk and
uncertainty are found, it has evolved predominantly in, and today remains most closely
associated with, the environmental arena. This is not surprising: Environmental problems
typically arise in settings of risk and uncertainty. For example, existing science and data
may be inadequate to establish that (i) a particular activity or substance poses a hazard;
(ii) assuming that it does, exactly what harmful effects will results from the activity or
substance; and (iii) harmful effects that are observed today in fact resulted from the
activity or substance in question, as opposed to some other source. Moreover, even if
scientific evidence tends to support limiting (or even banning) an activity or the use of a
substance, environmental harms often do not manifest themselves until an extended
period of time has elapsed. This further complicates the scientific study, and validation,
of environmental risks.
6

See Frank B. Cross, Paradoxical Perils of the Precautionary Principle, 53 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 851,
851 (1996) (“Few principles are better ensconced in the law and philosophy of environmentalism than is
the ‘precautionary principle.’”). On the history and evolution of the principle, see generally ARIE
TROUWBORST, EVOLUTION AND STATUS OF THE PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE 7-31 (2002).
7
David Dana explains: “Commentators trace the precautionary principle to the German concept of
Vorsoge, which literally means ‘beforehand or prior care and worry.’ It connotes ‘caring for or looking
after, fretting or worrying about and obtaining provisions, or providing for.’” David A. Dana, A Behavioral
Economic Defense of the Precautionary Principle, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 1315, 1315 n.3 (2003) (quoting Sonja
Boehmer-Christiansen, The Precautionary Principle in Germany—Enabling Government, in INTERPRETING
THE PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE 31, 38 (Timothy O’Riordan & James Cameron eds., 1994).
8
Risk and uncertainty differ from one another, and in ways that may matter to application of the
precautionary principle. See infra note 30.
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The precautionary principle is nothing short of ascendant on the international
stage, so much so that many categorize it constituting customary international law.10 It
is recited in numerous international environmental statements and treaties.11 While it has
gained a solid foothold in European Union environmental treaties and law,12 its success at
infiltrating American environmental law has been far more limited.13
9

9

E.g., Cross, supra note 6, at 854 (“The precautionary principle has recently assumed added
prominence with the growth of international environmental concern.”); James E. Hickey, Jr. & Vern R.
Walker, Refining the Precautionary Principle in International Environmental Law, 14 VA. ENVTL. L.J.
423, 423-24 (1995) (noting that, since 1987, international environmental instruments have “increasingly”
included references or allusions to the precautionary principle).
10
See, e.g., Mark Geistfeld, Implementing the Precautionary Principle, 31 ENVTL. L. REP. 11326,
11326 (2001) (noting that the principle is “considered by the European Union . . . to be a ‘full-fledged and
general principle of international law” (quoting Comm’n of the European Communities, Communication
from the Commission on the Precautionary Principle 11 (2000))); John O. McGinnis, The Appropriate
Hierarchy of Global Multilateralism and Customary International Law: The Example of the WTO, 44 VA.
J. INT’L L. 229, 269 (2003) (“While not all scholars agree that the precautionary principle is a matter of
customary international law, many respected scholars do.”); Richard B. Stewart, Environmental Regulatory
Decision Making under Uncertainty, 20 RES. L. & ECON. 71, 75 (Timothy Swanson ed., 2002) (noting that
“[i]t has been claimed that [the precautionary principle] is already, or s becoming established as[,] a
binding principle of customary international law,” but also that critics and skeptics of the principle “deny
that [it] has been established as customary international law”); Cass R. Sunstein, Irreversible and
Catastrophic, 91 CORNELL L. REV. 841, 843 n.6 (2006) (citing TROUWBORST, supra note 6, as “discussing
the Precautionary Principle as a foundational principle of international law”).
11
For compilations and lists, see McGinnis, supra note 10, at 276-84; Sunstein, supra note 10, at 84344; Hickey & Walker, supra note 9, at 432-36.
12
See, e.g., Sunstein, supra note 10, at 849; Cass R. Sunstein, Beyond the Precautionary Principle, 151
U. PA. L. REV. 1003, 1015 (2003) (noting that the European Commission has formally adopted the
precautionary principle). For discussion of European application of the principle, see generally Nicolas de
Sadeleer, The Precautionary Principle in EC Health and Environmental Law, 12 EUR. L.J. 139 (2006).
13
See, e.g., Jonathan B. Wiener, Regulation in a Multirisk, World in HUMAN AND ECOLOGICAL RISK
ASSESSMENT: THEORY AND PRACTICE 1509, 1510 (Dennis D. Paustenbach ed., 2002) [hereinafter Wiener,
Regulation in a Multirisk World] (“[A] common inference today is that Europe endorses the precautionary
principle . . . and seeks proactively to regulate risks, while the United States opposes the precautionary
principle and waits more circumspectly for evidence of actual harm before regulation . . . .”). Still, the
precautionary principle does underlie, if informally, certain aspects of United States environmental laws.
See, e.g., id.; Sunstein, supra note 10, at 844-45; Cross, supra note 6, at 855-56. Moreover, Cass Sunstein
and Jonathan Wiener have each argued that, even if Europe takes a more precautionary approach to
environmental risks, the United States takes more precaution in dealing with other risks, such as terrorism.
See Cass R. Sunstein, On the Divergent American Reactions to Terrorism and Climate Change, 107
COLUM. L. REV. 504 (2007); Cass R. Sunstein, Irreversible and Catastrophic: Global Warming, Terrorism,
and Other Problems, 23 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 3 (2005-2006); Jonathan B. Wiener, Whose Precaution After
All? A Comment on the Comparison and Evolution of Risk Regulatory Systems, 13 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L
L. 207 (2003) [hereinafter Wiener, Whose Precaution After All?]. This juxtaposition suggests that neither
region has a monopoly on precaution. See Wiener, Regulation in a Multirisk World, supra, at 1511;
Wiener, Whose Precaution After All?, supra, at 209. Indeed, the some version of the precautionary
principle arguably undergirds domestic views toward important issues such as freedom of speech and the
criminal justice system. See infra the text accompanying note 76.
The precautionary principle has established a United States beachhead. The city of San Francisco has
followed Europe’s lead and become “the first [city and county] in the nation to formally adopt a
‘precautionary principle.’” Carolyn Whetzel, Scientists, Policy Makers Argue Benefits, Perils of
Employing ‘Precautionary Principle’, DAILY ENVT. REP. (BNA), Aug. 26, 2003, at A12.
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In its basic form, the precautionary principle calls for the use of caution in making
regulatory decisions when risk or uncertainty is present.14 But this formulation is, if
unobjectionable,15 misleadingly simple as well as somewhat toothless.16 Some argue that
spread of the precautionary principle—and, indeed, even its application beyond mere
platitudes—is hampered by a lack of clarity,17 or at least agreement, as to the principle’s
meaning.18 Professor Wiener has set out three possible versions of the principle.19
Professor Stewart has identified four possible interpretations of the principle.20 Professor
Sunstein explains that Professor Stewart’s four interpretations help to identify two axes
along which the principle might vary: “the level of uncertainty that triggers a regulatory
response,” and “the tool that will be chosen in the face of uncertainty.”21 This
understanding, Professor Sunstein continues, allows for one to “easily imagine many
14

See Dana, supra note 7, at 1315 (“As a general matter, the precautionary principle counsels serious
contemplation of regulatory action in the face of evidence of health and environmental risk, even before the
magnitude of risk is necessarily known or any harm manifested.”).
15
See Sunstein, supra note 10, at 850 (“The weak versions of the Precautionary Principle are
unobjectionable and important.”); Sunstein, supra note 12, at 1012 (noting that there are “weak versions”
of the principle “to which no reasonable person could object”).
16
See, e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, CATASTROPHE: RISK AND RESPONSE 140 (2004) (“The ‘precautionary
principle’ (‘better safe than sorry’) . . . is not a satisfactory alternative to cost-benefit analysis, if only
because of its sponginess. . . .” (footnote omitted)); Geistfeld, supra note 10, at 11326 (“[I]f the core
aspects of the principle cannot yield a well-defined rule[,] . . . the hard question arises whether the
precautionary principle is anything more than sentiment or political slogan.”).
17
See, e.g., Geistfeld, supra note 10, at 11326 (“The vagueness of the principle explains why it so hard
to implement.”); Andrew Jordan & Timothy O’Riordan, The Precautionary Principle in Contemporary
Environmental Policy and Politics, in PROTECTING PUBLIC HEALTH AND THE ENVIRONMENT:
IMPLEMENTING THE PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE 15, 22 (Carolyn Raffensperger & Joel A. Tickner, eds.
1999) (“Sceptics . . . claim [that the principle’s] popularity derives from its vagueness; that it fails to bind
anyone to anything or to resolve any of the deep dilemmas that characterize modern environmental policy
making.”).
18
See, e.g., McGinnis, supra note 10, at 272 (observing that “the multiplicity of . . . meanings”
attributed to the principle “complicates the search for a general precautionary principle”); Sunstein, supra
note 10, at 848 (“[T]here are twenty or more definitions of the Precautionary Principle, and they are not all
compatible with one another.”); Stewart, supra note 10, at 75 (“With a few exceptions, there is a
remarkable lack of analytic care or rigor regarding the substance of, and justification for, various versions
of [the precautionary principle] by those who advocate or favor their adoption.”); Hickey & Walker, supra
note 9, at 424 (“The assertion and ‘codification’ in international agreements and instruments of an illdefined, ambiguous ‘[precautionary] principle’ has created uncertainty in international environmental
law.”); see also Sunstein, supra note 12, at 1011 (noting that the principle has “numerous definitions” that
“are not compatible with one another”); Wiener, Regulation in a Multirisk World, supra note 13, at 1513
(noting that “[s]tatements of the precautionary principle are varied and often vague,” and citing Per Sandin,
Dimensions of the Precautionary Principle, 5 HUM ECOLOGICAL RISK ASSESSMENT 889 (1999), as
identifying “19 different formulations” of the principle”); Stephen M. Gardiner, A Core Precautionary
Principle, 14 J. POL. PHIL. 33, 37-45 (2006) (setting out various possible forms of the principle).
The precautionary principle is not alone in this regard. The “polluter pays principle” is another primary
normative principle of environmental law—and, again, especially at the international level—that also
suffers from lack of clarity. See Jonathan Remy Nash, Too Much Market? Conflict between Tradable
Pollution Allowances and the “Polluter Pays” Principle, 24 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 465, 472-78 (2000)
(elucidating various interpretations of the polluter pays principle).
19
See Wiener, Regulation in a Multirisk World, supra note 13, at 1513-21 (elucidating three variants of
the principle).
20
See Stewart, supra note 10, at 78.
21
Sunstein, supra note 12, at 1014. See Sandin, supra note 18, at 890-91 (elucidating four dimensions
along which the precautionary principle might vary: threat, uncertainty, action, and command).
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other variations on these themes.”22 And, having surveyed international declarations and
agreements that include statements of the precautionary principle, Professor McGinnis
concluded that “[s]ometimes” a single declaration or agreement itself “encompasses
several meanings.”23
Further complicating the spread of the precautionary principle is the fact that, in
some of its forms, the principle becomes inherently contradictory. It is easy to say that
one should take steps to avoid large and unnecessary risks, but this ignores the fact that
there are likely are risks and uncertainties not only to allowing an activity to proceed or a
substance to be used, but also to regulating that activity or substance.24 Followed to its
logical conclusion, the principle in such forms would utterly paralyze societal actors.25
Along similar lines, the precautionary principle could, but should not, be read to
halt virtually all potentially risky activities and the use of all potentially risky substances.
While the precautionary principle may appropriately draw attention to risks and
uncertainties in failing to regulate that governments and people tend to underestimate,26 a
precautionary principle that emphasizes those risks and uncertainties to the exclusion of
the countervailing risks and uncertainties associated with regulation itself, reduces the
risk of not regulating false negatives, but also—perhaps in some situations more
dangerously—advocates regulating in the face of possible false positives. Taken to its
logical extreme, it would “bring valuable activities to a halt,” and would “be impossible”
to apply broadly.27

22

Sunstein, supra note 12, at 1014. See id. at 1014-15 (describing as examples the “Information
Disclosure Precautionary Principle” and the “Economic Incentive Precautionary Principle”).
23
McGinnis, supra note 10, at 272. He also laments that “even a single strand of the precautionary
principle is open to different operational meanings.” Id.
24
See Sunstein, supra note 12, at 1020-29; Sunstein, supra note 10, at 862-63; see also Richard A.
Epstein, In Defense of the “Old” Public Health, 69 BROOK. L. REV. 1421, 1458 (2004) (“[I]t is a mistake to
rely on any version of a precautionary principle that attaches enormous weight to errors that allow
dangerous activities to go forward while slighting the losses associated with the beneficial activities that
turn out to be thwarted.”).
25
See Sunstein, supra note 10, at 850-53. See generally Cross, supra note 6.
26
See Dana, supra note 7 (arguing that the precautionary principle is a countervailing balance to
cognitive biases that tend, wrongly, to influence public policy away from regulating activities and
substances that pose large risks and uncertainties); Sunstein, supra note 10, at 870-71.
27
Wiener, Whose Precaution After All?, supra note 13, at 224. Professor Wiener elucidates:
Precaution may avoid the harms of inaction on false negatives (risks thought to be minor that turn
out to be serious) but incur the harms of overreaction to false positives (risks thought to be serious
that turn out to be minor). Both types of errors are harmful to society. The harms of ignoring false
negatives include the health and environmental damages from the unrestricted risk. The harms of
regulating false positives include high costs to consumers and workers, unemployment, lost
innovations of helpful new products, restrictions on personal choices, and public cynicism about
exaggerated risks (“crying wolf”). An extreme policy of zero risk would bring valuable activities
to a halt; applied broadly it would be impossible. The goal is not zero false negatives but the best
balance of the two types of errors that we can achieve.
Id. at 223-24 (footnote omitted). See also Sunstein, supra note 12, at 1035-54 (arguing that those who rely
upon the precautionary principle to reach concrete conclusions often do so in tandem with various cognitive
biases, and that this process tends to render the precautionary principle, used in this way, a blunt instrument
with which to attain policy guidance). But cf. Douglas A. Kysar, It Might Have Been: Risk, Precaution,
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The general absence of agreement over the proper scope of the principle
notwithstanding, some commentators have endeavored to construct practically applicable,
and normatively desirable, formulations of the precautionary principle. Recent
commentary tend to advance narrower, more cabined versions of the principle, and to
coalesce around three characteristics of settings in which the principle appropriately
might be invoked:28 (i) settings in which the risks of harm are uncertain; (ii) settings in
which harm might be irreversible and what is lost irreplaceable; and (iii) settings in which
the harm that might result would be catastrophic. First, the heartland of the precautionary
principle encompasses situations where the risk cannot be effectively assessed or reliably
cabined29—i.e., settings in which there is uncertainty rather than simply risk.30 Second, if
a failure to regulate may result in irreversible harm, then an investment in regulation may
be justified by a desire to retain flexibility by avoiding irreversible results. Put
economically, regulation in the face of serious irreversible costs is equivalent to
purchasing an option to preserve the opportunity to take steps to avoid the irreversible
harm in the future.31 Third, the possibility of catastrophic harm may justify precautionary
and Opportunity Costs, 22 J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 1, 44-48 (2006) (arguing that there may be a moral
basis on which to distinguish between acts and omissions).
28
That some commentators may agree on when some version of the precautionary principle should
apply does not mean that they necessarily agree on what version of the principle should apply, i.e., exactly
what “directive” follows from the principle. For example, Professor Kysar presents the precautionary
approach as an option distinct from cost-benefit analysis, see generally Kysar, supra note 27, while Judge
Posner and Professors Stewart and Sunstein present the precautionary principle as an adjunct to traditional
cost-benefit analysis. E.g., POSNER, supra note 16, at 148 (calling for “a modest version of the
precautionary principle” in cases of catastrophic risk that would “plac[e] a thumb on the cost side of the
cost-benefit analysis.”). My proposal is limited to granting judicial standing and does not address to the
substance of any claim should be addressed on the merits. See infra the text accompanying notes 63-64.
29
Professor Kysar explains that the precautionary principle “can be defended as a pragmatic
decisionmaking heuristic that is particularly well-suited to the task of fostering consideration of how best to
safeguard life and the environment under conditions of uncertainty and ignorance.” Kysar, supra note 27,
at 14. (He defines uncertainty as situations where probabilities are poorly defined and outcomes well
defined, and ignorance as settings in which probabilities are also poorly defined but outcomes are poorly
defined as well. Id.) See also Gardiner, supra note 18, at 50 (describing a Rawlsian version of the
principle that would apply in cases of uncertainty, but not risk or ignorance); Sandin, supra note 18, at 89293 (describing the “uncertainty dimension” of the precautionary principle).
Professor Sunstein argues that situations of uncertainty indeed come to pass and are not trivial.
Sunstein, supra note 10, at 875-77, 882-92. He explains: “In my view, uncertainty is both real and rare in
the environmental domain; but this is an empirical judgment, and it may be wrong.” Id. at 886.
With an apparent nod to some sort of precaution, Judge Posner suggests different ways that standard
cost-benefit analysis might be adjusted to deal with situations of uncertainty. See POSNER, supra note 16,
at 175-87.
30
Under traditional definitions, “risk is variability in outcomes that can be captured by a probability
distribution, but uncertainty cannot be quantified in this way.” Henry E. Smith, Property and Property
Rules, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1719, 1724 (2004).
Commentators who otherwise endorse the use of cost-benefit analysis as the preferred tool for
regulatory guidance argue that the precautionary principle is least applicable where the risks of harm that
may result are readily and accurately quantifiable. E.g., Stewart, supra note 10, at 85-86; see also id. at 8687 (recognizing other factors that may influence decisions). So, too, do they argue that is it not the realm
of the precautionary principle where the risks may not be precisely quantifiable, but nonetheless susceptible
to estimation within a reliable range. See id. at 87-90; POSNER, supra note 16, at 173.
31
As Judge Posner puts it in the context of the greenhouse effect, it may make sense for society to, in
effect, “purchas[e] an option to enable global warming to be stopped or slowed at some future time at a
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regulation. Even if the probability of a catastrophe occurring is low, “the incremental
costs of the possible catastrophic byproducts of progress” may outweigh the associated
benefits of the progress itself.32 Further, if the probability of the catastrophic result is low
(or very uncertain), it may improperly discounted because of heuristics upon which
people rely to aid in situations (such as are presented by low probabilities) where our
cognitive abilities are challenged. When these features—uncertainty, the possibility of
irreversible harm, and the possibility of catastrophic harm—coincide, it would seem that
the case for the precautionary principle is strongest.33
III.

STANDING

In this Part, I briefly explain the genesis and contours of federal court standing
doctrine. I also discuss how and why environmental cases have often been on the outer
edge, and at the forefront of the evolution, of standing over the last forty years. I then
summarize the debate over standing between the majority and Chief Justice Roberts in
dissent in the Massachusetts case, with a focus on the odd absence of discussion of the
precautionary principle in the case.
A. In General
Federal court standing limitations arise directly out of the Constitution, and also
out of prudential concerns.34 Article III of the United States Constitution vests the
federal judicial power with respect to “cases” and “controversies.”35 The Court has
interpreted the core constitutional standing requirement to call for a plaintiff to allege
(i) personal injury that is both (ii) “fairly traceable” to the defendant’s unlawful conduct,
and (iii) likely to be redressed by the requested relief.36 The Court has elucidated that, to
be sufficient to meet standing, an injury must be “distinct and palpable,” and not
“abstract” or “conjectural.”37 A generalized grievance is insufficient.38
Beyond any constitutional requirements, the Court over the years has imposed
limitations on federal courts’ ability to hear cases. For example, under the “political
lower cost” when the other option is to do nothing and risk harm that cannot be reversed. POSNER, supra
note 16, at 162. “Should further research show at the problem of global warming is not a serious one, the
option would not be exercised.” Id.
32
Id.
33
See, e.g., Sunstein, supra note 10, at 894 (“It is possible to combine a concern about catastrophe with
a focus on irreversible harm in a way that generates an Irreversible and Catastrophic Harm Precautionary
Principle.”); see also Kenneth J. Arrow & Anthony C. Fisher, Environmental Preservation, Uncertainty,
and Irreversibility, 88 Q.J. ECON. 312 (1974) (emphasizing the importance of uncertainty and irreversibility
in environmental problems).
34
E.g., Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 751 (1984).
35
U.S. CONST. art. III.
36
Allen, 468 U.S. at 751. But cf. RICHARD H. FALLON, JR., DANIEL J. MELTZER & DAVID L. SHAPIRO,
HART AND WECHSLER’S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 131 (5th ed. 2003) (noting
commentators who have questioned the claim that injury-in-fact is required by citizens suing the
government to establish standing).
37
E.g., Allen, 468 U.S. at 751.
38
E.g., Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 575-76 (1992).
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question doctrine,” the courts find that plaintiffs lack standing to pursue claims in court
that would more appropriately be dealt with in the other, elected branches of
government.39
Real refinement of standing requirements is a relatively recent development.
Before the middle of the last century, “most litigants asserted legal interests plainly
recognized at common law.”40 Among the trends that prompted courts to elucidate
standing requirements was “the advent of the administrative state and the enactment of
statutes to protect interests, unprotected at common law, that were shared by large
numbers of people.”41 It is hardly surprising, then, that environmental law disputes have
played a major role in raising issues on the edges of existing standing doctrine: While
common law standing doctrine evolved out of and focused on economic injuries, the
injuries in environmental law cases tend to be of a much more ephemeral nature.42
The Supreme Court has explained that standing requirements serve the purpose of
sharpening the issues for the court to decide by harnessing the presentation of those
issues by true adversaries who care about the outcome in the case.43 It also thus

39

See, e.g., Nixon v. United States, 506 U.S. 224 (1993).
FALLON ET AL., supra note 36, at 127.
41
Id.
42
See RICHARD J. LAZARUS, THE MAKING OF ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 82 (2004) (characterizing the
Court’s early environmental standing jurisprudence as “fairly straightforward and flexible”). For example,
it was in environmental cases that the Supreme Court was confronted with, and resolved, the following
questions:
Whether a non-economic, aesthetic interest may qualify as an “injury” for standing purposes
and, if so, whether such an injury must be particular to the plaintiff. The Court answered both
questions in the affirmative. See Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 734-35 (1972).
Whether generalized allegations by a single member of an environmental organization that
their recreational opportunities might be impinged by possible government action were sufficient
to give the environmental organization standing. The Court held that they were not. See Lujan v.
National Wildlife Fed., 497 U.S. 871, 889 (1990).
Whether standing to challenge a polluter’s alleged noncompliance with the Clean Water Act
could rest upon allegations of the plaintiffs’ concern that their property had become polluted by
virtue of the defendant’s actions. The Court held that it could. See Friends of the Earth Inc. v.
Laidlaw Environmental Servs. (TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 181 (2000).
Commentators in environmental law often advocate the expansion of standing to accommodate more
environmental claims. See, e.g., David A. Dana, Existence Value and Federal Preservation Regulation, 28
HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 343, 397-99 (2004) (arguing that standing doctrine should be expanded to recognize
the “existence value” of environmental amenities, thus ridding standing doctrine of “rigid . . . geographic
formalism” (quoting Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 595 (1992) (Stevens, J., dissenting)));
Robin Kundis Craig, Removing “the Cloak of a Standing Inquiry”: Pollution Regulation, Public Health,
and Private Risk in the Injury-in-Fact Analysis, (manuscript; SSRN # 966232) (arguing that standing
doctrine should be expanded to recognize probabilistic risks to health as sufficient to satisfy the injury-infact analysis); RICHARD J. LAZARUS, THE MAKING OF ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 134-35 (2004) (criticizing the
modern Court’s requirement of individualized harm as particularly difficult to meet in environmental
cases).
43
See, e.g., Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for Separation of Church and State,
Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 472 (1982) (noting that standing’s injury requirement “tends to assure that the legal
questions presented to the court will be resolved, not in the rarified atmosphere of a debating society, but in
a concrete factual context conducive to a realistic appreciation of the consequences of judicial action.”).
40
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precludes courts from issuing unconstitutional advisory opinions.44 The Court has also
emphasized the role of standing in bolstering the separation of powers between the
judicial branches and the other branches of government.45 Commentators have recently
suggested that standing serves other purposes as well. Professor Stearns, for example,
argues that standing rules have developed, and are desirable, because they make it
difficult for ideologically motivated plaintiffs opportunistically to manipulate courts’
dockets,46 while Professor Kontorovich suggests that the absence of standing would
short-circuit private bargaining by people who would be affected by broad court
decisions.47
B. Standing in Massachusetts v. EPA
The Supreme Court grappled with standing in the case of Massachusetts v. EPA,
where environmental organizations and governmental entities—Massachusetts, among
them—claimed that EPA’s failure to regulate greenhouse gas emissions from motor
vehicles violated the Clean Air Act.48 The issue of greenhouse gas emissions has risen to
the forefront of environmental concerns over the past decade. Over time, a growing
consensus of scientists has argued that the increasing presence of anthropogenic
greenhouse gases in the upper atmosphere has acted as a shield that acts, much like a
greenhouse, to retain heat instead of allowing it to radiate out into space. The greenhouse
effect, then, results—and, according to many scientific predictions, will continue to result
more and more—in increasing temperatures on the earth, with concomitant melting of the
polar ice caps, rises in the world’s ocean levels, and flooding of low lying areas.
Recent American public debate over greenhouse gases and the greenhouse effect
has focused on the question of whether scientific evidence of the greenhouse effect is
sufficient to warrant remedial action.49 Some question the validity of scientific studies
44

See, e.g., FEC v. Akins, 524 U.S. 11, 23-24 (1998).
See Allen, at 750; see also Antonin Scalia, The Doctrine of Standing as an Essential Element of the
Separation of Powers, 17 SUFFOLK L. REV. 881 (1983).
46
See Maxwell L. Stearns, Standing Back from the Forest: Justiciability and Social Choice, 83 CALIF.
L. REV. 1309 (1995); see also Maxwell L. Stearns, Standing and Social Choice: Historical Evidence, 144
U. PA. L. REV. 309 (drawing on historical evidence and caselaw to bolster this point). See also Kenneth E.
Scott, Standing in the Supreme Court – A Functional Analysis, 86 HARV. L. REV. 645 (1973) (arguing that
standing serves the purpose of rationing scarce judicial resources and defining the courts’ policymaking
role).
47
See Eugene Kontorovich, What Standing is Good for, 93 VA. L. REV. (forthcoming 2007).
48
The original rulemaking petition was brought by various environmental interest groups. The
governmental entities, including Massachusetts, subsequently intervened as plaintiffs. See Massachusetts,
126 S. Ct. at 1451.
49
There has also been much public debate on a second issue—whether, even if global warming is
validly a matter of world concern, the United States should act to reduce its greenhouse gas emissions when
other countries do not. In 1992, the United States and 153 other countries entered into a treaty—the
Framework Convention on Climate Change. Five years later, the meeting of the parties to the Convention
drafted a follow-up protocol—the Kyoto Protocol. While the original Convention set up only a framework
for dealing with greenhouse gas emissions, it did not impose upon signatories any substantive obligations
with respect to emissions. In contrast, the Kyoto Protocol does impose emissions reductions on developed
countries, but not on developing countries. Many in the United States argued that, insofar as global
warming is a global problem that results from a global pollutant—i.e., a pollutant for which the place of
45
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that validate the greenhouse effect, or demand a larger consensus of scientists on the
issue.50 This debate, which one might have expected to dominate a current Supreme
Court opinion on global warming, was strangely absent from the opinions in the
Massachusetts case.
The majority in Massachusetts adhered to the view that EPA did not contest either
that anthropogenic emissions were exacerbating the greenhouse effect, or that over time
major ramifications would occur as a result. In noting that “[t]he harms associated with
climate change are serious and well recognized,” the Court observed that “EPA regards
as an ‘objective and independent assessment of the relevant science” a report by the
National Research Council that “identifies a number of environmental changes that have
already inflicted significant harms.”51 In response to the Chief Justice’s dissent’s
assertion that Massachusetts’ alleged harm was “conjectural,” Justice Stevens, implicitly
referencing EPA’s acquiescence in Massachusetts’ allegations of current and prospective
harm, noted that “[n]o one, save perhaps the dissenters, disputes those allegations.”52
And, summing up its resolution of the standing issue, the majority observed that “the rise
origin is irrelevant to the ultimate environmental effect, which is global—it made little sense for the United
States to commit to reduce its greenhouse gas emissions when developing countries—especially China and
India, whose greenhouse gas emissions are predicted to rise substantially in the coming decades—
undertook no such obligations. The United States Senate unanimously passed a resolution expressing the
view that the United States should not enter into the Kyoto Protocol as drafted. S. Res. 98, 105th Cong.,
1st Sess. (July 25, 1997). President Clinton never forwarded the Kyoto Protocol to the Senate for possible
ratification. Massachusetts, 126 S. Ct. at 1449.
The issue of whether the United States should undertake emissions reductions while other countries do
not also arose in the context of standing in the Massachusetts case. EPA argued that the expectation that
increased emissions from countries like China and India would exacerbate the greenhouse effect even if the
United States undertook cuts meant that the relief that the plaintiffs sought would not in fact solve the
problem of which they complained, meaning that the standing doctrine’s redressability prong was not met.
The majority opinion dismissed that argument, explaining that “[a] reduction in domestic emissions would
slow the pace of global emissions increases, no matter what happens elsewhere.” 126 S. Ct. at 1458. In
dissent, Chief Justice Roberts argued that the fact that emissions from other countries “are likely to be
overwhelmed many times over by emissions increases elsewhere in the world,” id. at 1469 (Roberts, C.J.,
dissenting), made it not likely—as required by standing doctrine—that the relief the plaintiffs sought would
redress the problems they alleged, id. at 1470 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
50
Professor Kysar has explained:
[U]ncertainty pervades, we might even say defines, the climate change problem. We are
unsure how much of the observed warming is attributable to greenhouse gas emissions. We do not
know with certainty what the size of the human population will become over the next century. We
do not know what the reference case of economic growth will be. We do not understand and
therefore cannot model how sulfate particles, water vapor, and clouds interact in the atmosphere to
mitigate or to enhance warming effects. We do not know with any degree of precision how
temperature increases will impact agriculture, forests, vector-related diseases, heat-related deaths,
flood zones, coastlines, storm intensity levels, freshwater supplies, or species extinctions. Perhaps
most troubling, we cannot begin to pinpoint the likelihood of catastrophic climate-related events
such as the disintegration of the West Antarctic Ice Sheet, the shutdown of thermohaline
circulation in the Atlantic, or the release of frozen methane deposits. In short, we do not know
with anything other than an anemic level of confidence what will be the consequences of our
atmospheric experiment.
Douglas A. Kysar, Climate Change, Cultural Transformation, and Comprehensive Rationality, 31 B.C.
ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 555, 563-64 (2004) (footnotes omitted).
51
126 S. Ct. at 1455.
52
Id. at 1456 n.21.
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in sea levels associated with global warming has already harmed and will continue to
harm Massachusetts.”53 In support of this proposition, the opinion cites the petitioners’
affidavits which, the opinion notes, were “uncontested.”54
The only allusion in the majority opinion to reasoning grounded in some version
of the precautionary principle is Justice Stevens’ statement that “[t]he risk of catastrophic
harm, though remote, is nevertheless real.”55 This lone statement, however, appears only
in the concluding paragraph of the Court’s discussion of standing. Nowhere in the meat
of the majority’s standing analysis is there consideration given to the facts as presenting a
harm that may or may not occur but that, if it does occur, would be catastrophic. Nor is
there discussion of, or reliance upon, the existence of uncertainty56 or the potential for
irreversibility. Rather, the majority presented global warming as a problem that is
already is occurring, and is virtually certain to worsen.
Chief Justice Roberts’ dissenting opinion took strong issue with the majority
opinion’s presentation of the facts underlying global warming. Chief Justice Roberts
criticized the majority for basing its conclusions about the likely loss by Massachusetts of
coastal lowlands on a lone, unelaborated statement in one affidavit.57 The Chief Justice
also assailed the majority for concluding that future harm was “imminent” based upon
computer models that had margins of error that rendered the majority’s conclusion, in his
view, questionable. He emphasized that “accepting a century-long time horizon and a
series of compounded estimates renders requirements of imminence and immediacy
utterly toothless.”58
Chief Justice Roberts’ dissent, then, expressly adheres to the traditional view that
harms that have not been shown to be either actual or imminent are not sufficient to
support standing. Implicit in the dissent is the additional point that that rule holds even if
the harm that may occur (albeit not harm that is, based upon the available evidence,
imminent) would be catastrophic. In effect, then, the Chief Justice’s dissent rejects
incorporation of the precauationary principle into standing jurisprudence. But it
dismisses the notion summarily, with no analysis of whether either the Constitution
would admit such an incorporation, or whether such an incorporation would vindicate the
policies that underlie standing.

53

Id. at 1458.
Id. The lone judge to find standing in the court below followed similar reasoning. See Massachusetts
v. EPA, 415 F.3d 50, 66 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (Tatel, J., dissenting) (“[I]f EPA wants to challenge the facts
petitioners have set forth in their affidavits, it has an obligation to respond to the petitioners . . . . EPA
makes no such challenge.”), rev’d, 127 S. Ct. 1438 (2007); id. at 67 (Tatel, J., dissenting) (“EPA nowhere
challenges petitioners’ declarations . . . .”).
55
127 S. Ct. at 1458.
56
Perhaps related to uncertainty is Justice Stevens comment—found in a footnote—that Chief Justice
Roberts characterized Massachusetts’ assertions as “conclusory,” id. at 1467 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting),
“presumably because they do not quantify Massachusetts’ land loss with the exactitude he would prefer. . . .
Yet the likelihood that Massachusetts’ coastline will recede has nothing to do with whether petitions have
determined the precise metes and bounds of their soon-to-be-flooded land.” Id. at 1456 n.21.
57
Id. at 1467 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
58
Id. at 1468 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
54
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In sum, the dissent rejected the application of the precautionary principle
implicitly and without discussion. The majority treated the case as if existing standing
doctrine controlled the outcome.59 It had no need to discuss the possible application of
the precautionary principle because, on its presentation of the facts, the presence of
standing was clear.
IV.

INCORPORATING THE PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE INTO STANDING DOCTRINE

In this Part, I discuss the incorporation of the precautionary principle into
standing jurisprudence. I begin with an explanation of how the principle could have been
used by the Court in the Massachusetts case to support its conclusion that there was
standing. I then explain how the incorporation of the precautionary principle would not
upset existing standing jurisprudence; to the contrary, it is consistent with it. Last, I
elucidate why the importation of the principle is not simply possible, but in fact is
normatively desirable.
A. A Proposal for Precautionary-Based Standing
My basic proposal for incorporating the precautionary principle into standing
doctrine is relatively straightforward.60 Courts should find that the “injury” prong of
standing is satisfied where the plaintiff can show that the harm that it might suffer would
be catastrophic and irreversible, and that its occurrence is subject to great uncertainty.61
Application of precautionary-based standing to the facts in Massachusetts would
change the reasoning, but not the outcome, of the case. The emission by humans of
59

The one area where the majority suggested that the case at bar differed from run-of-the-mill standing
cases was the fact that the plaintiff as to whom standing was found was a sovereign state. See id. at 1454
(“It is of considerable relevance that the party seeking review here is a sovereign State and not . . . a private
individual.”); id. at 1455 (noting that Massachusetts “is entitled [Massachusetts] to special solicitude in our
standing analysis.”). Oddly, however, the majority soon thereafter described the basis for Massachusetts’
standing as its actual ownership of title in lands that might be submerged as a result of global warming. See
id. at 1456 (“Because the Commonwealth ‘owns a substantial portion of the state’s coastal property,’ it has
alleged a particularized injury in its capacity as a landowner.” (footnote omitted; quoting Standing
Appendix 171 (declaration of the Karst R. Hoogeboom)). Given that ownership of land that might itself be
harmed is an accepted basis for standing and not a status that is particular to sovereigns, one is left to
wonder why the majority thought it necessary to invoke Massachusetts’ special status as sovereign in the
first instance. As the Chief Justice’s dissent comments, while “[i]t is not at all clear how the Court’s
‘special solicitude’ for Massachusetts plays out in the standing analysis, except as an implicit concession
that petitioners cannot establish standing on traditional terms,” id. at 1466 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting),
“[t]he good news is that the Court’s ‘special solicitude’ for Massachusetts limits the future applicability of
the diluted standing requirement applied in this case,” id. at 1471 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
Below, I explain that it might make sense to limit application of the precautionary principle in the
standing inquiry to cases in which sovereigns assert claims. See infra the text accompanying notes 68-71.
In this sense, my proposed incorporation of the precautionary principle makes better use of the special
sovereign status in standing doctrine than does the majority opinion.
60
Below I explain that the basic proposal could be narrowed to apply only in cases in which the plaintiff
is a state sovereign. See infra the text accompanying notes 68-71.
61
Courts also might use precautionary standing to find the “causation” prong to be met where the
relevant causal link is subject to uncertainty. Arguments similar to those advanced in the text for the
“injury” prong would apply.
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greenhouse gases presents the possibility of catastrophic and irreversible harms the
occurrence of which is, under current scientific understandings, uncertain.62 Thus, the
proposal would allow courts to conclude that there is standing without having to decide
definitively whether in fact those harms are actually “concrete” and “imminent” in the
traditional sense.
Invocation of precautionary-based standing would in no way affect the litigation
of the issues in the case on the merits. For this reason, some of the interpretive problems
that have dogged the implementation of the precautionary principle in other—generally
merit-based—contexts would not arise here. For example, while the possibility of
competing irreversibilities—that is, irreversibilities both with government action and
without it—makes application of the precautionary principle difficult to determine in fact
whether to undertake steps today to reduce greenhouse gas emissions,63 such potential
conflicts ought not to paralyze applications of the principle in aid of determining
standing, insofar as standing is merely a preliminary hurdle on the way to a determination
on the merits.64 And, since the use of the principle in aid of determining standing would
in no way require that the principle also be used at the subsequent merits stage, the
proposal also would not itself raise the specter of such conflicts at a later stage in any
litigation.
Since it relies upon a narrow construction of the precautionary principle, the
proposal is consistent with the principle. Situations in which there is uncertainty as to
which catastrophic and irreversible harm may occur fall within the heartland of the
precautionary principle.65 While some might prefer broader application of the
principle—in terms of either the trigger or the set of situations in which it applies, or
both66—the limited application of the principle called for under the proposal surely does
not expand the reach of the precautionary principle.
The proposal is also largely consistent with existing standing doctrine. To be
sure, it would work a change in some cases. But the set of cases in which there is

62

See supra 49-50 and accompanying text.
See, e.g., Sunstein, supra note 10, at 863 (noting a conflict between Judge Posner, who advocates
such steps, and “many economists [who] have concluded, unlike Judge Posner, that the existence of
uncertainty and irreversibility argue for less, not more, in way of investments in reducing greenhouse-gas
emissions”).
64
Any consideration of precaution in the face of irreversible harm should consider the possibility of
irreversible harm that might result from the exercise of that precaution; in other words, irreversible harm
might result from regulation as well as from the absence of regulation. See supra the text accompanying
notes 24-25. Because a grant of standing to pursue a lawsuit does not resolve the case on the merits, this
concern, though valid, would not seem to be of import in the setting of standing. The possibility of
conflicting irreversibilities would be considered at the merits stage, and the adoption of the precautionary
principle to aid in determining standing would in no way require the merits also to be determined with
reference to any version of the precautionary principle.
65
See supra the text accompanying notes 28-33.
66
See supra note 28.
63
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uncertainty as to whether catastrophic, irreversible harm will occur is a limited one.
Indeed, it is likely the minority of environmental cases that fall within this category.67
At the same time, one justifiably might be concerned that, even if the proposal
would not in fact result in standing being achieved many more cases and thus in many
more cases proceeding to the merits, the proposal might suboptimally encourage more
people to file suit and try to prove standing under the slightly more relaxed, if limitedly
applicable, standard. In other words, one might be concerned not with the floodgates of
litigation, but rather with the floodgates of standing that lead to the floodgates of
litigation, and that opening the floodgates of standing itself might to some degree
overwhelm the courts.
In response to this concern—and to the related concern that concern that the
proposal as structured would effect too large a change in existing standing doctrine—
there is a way in which the proposal can further be cabined. The relaxed standing rule
under circumstances of precaution could be made available only to state governments
who bring lawsuits in their sovereign capacity.68 To justify this additional possible
restriction, I need to demonstrate that it accords with existing standing doctrine, and also
that the additional restriction responds logically to the criticisms of the basic proposal
that I have identified.
First, the Court since the Lochner era has recognized that a state’s sovereignty
confers upon it greater latitude, than private actors typically enjoy, in seeking relief
grounded in that sovereignty in the federal courts.69 Indeed, the majority in
Massachusetts went out of its way to recognize the “special solicitude” due states who
advance claims in federal court in their capacity as sovereigns.70

67

See Sunstein, supra note 10, at 886 (“In my view, uncertainty is both real and rare in the
environmental domain; but this is an empirical judgment, and it may be wrong.”). Cf. Craig, supra note 42,
at 20-25 (noting that health risks—though perhaps not catastrophic in nature—generally pervade federal
clean air and clean water regulation).
68
In addition, Congress could always narrow the availability of standing generally by narrowing the
relevant statutory “zone of interest.” The drawback to such a blunderbuss approach is that it would narrow
the availability of standing in all cases, not just those in which precautionary standing would be invoked.
Presumably, however, Congress could simply narrow the “zone of interest” only as it relates to parties
seeking to invoke precautionary standing. The justifications for such congressional action would be the
same as those discussed in the text for the courts to impose such a restriction.
69
See Ann Woolhandler & Michael G. Collins, State Standing, 81 VA. L. REV. 387, 450-64 (1995)
(describing the evolution of standing doctrine during the Lochner era to allow states to advance claims
based upon their sovereignty). In comparison, the early Court only recognized state standing where states
could bring claims grounded in the common law. See id. at 397-434.
70
127 S. Ct. at 1455. See supra note 59; Thomas W. Merrill, Global Warming as a Public Nuisance, 30
COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 293 299-305 (2005) (arguing in favor of a less stringent standing hurdles in cases
brought by public officials). While Justice Stevens was correct in drawing this distinction, the majority
opinion’s actual use of the distinction to resolve the Massachusetts case remains obscure. See 127 S. Ct. at
1455. Ironically, then, the proposal in this respect would make better use of this distinction than did the
majority that purported to rely upon it.
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Second, there is a certain logic to restricting access to precautionary-based
standing to sovereigns.71 Even if one is concerned that people are likely to believe that
precautionary-based standing applies in a host of cases where it in fact does not, one
might be more sanguine that states will take a more deliberative approach and be more
hesitant to try to invoke a court’s jurisdiction. And, even if that is not entirely true, the
restriction would in any event constrain the number of cases in which standing would be
found on the basis of precaution.
Finally, I note that precautionary-based standing provides a workable standard for
courts to apply. While the courts would have to develop notions of catastrophic and
irreversible harms, that is hardly an insurmountable task.72 Moreover, to whatever extent
application of precautionary-based standing may prove to present a challenge to courts, it
does not seem to present any more of a challenge that does existing standing doctrine.
Indeed, existing standing doctrine may demand more of courts. After all, existing
standing doctrine calls upon courts to decide when an injury is “concrete” and
“imminent.” In many environmental cases, this requires courts to examine, and reach
conclusions with respect to, scientific evidence, which is generally not the forte of

71

Cf. Woolhandler & Collins, supra note 69, at 502-17 (arguing in favor of limits on sovereign
authority to file suit, in part on the ground that sovereigns should not be allowed standing when private
individuals would have standing to file similar claims).
One also might consider extending (whether initially or at some point later) the availability of
precautionary standing to localities. This would depend on the frequency with which localities seek to
pursue relief even while the states of which they are a part do not, on the desirability of allowing them so to
act, and on the costs of allowing additional actions to be litigated in federal court.
72
Cf. POSNER, supra note 16, at 5-6 (offering a preliminary definition of catastrophic harm). Courts are
already called upon to make analogous judgments. For example, tort law allows one to enter onto land
possessed by someone else, and to commit an act which would otherwise be a trespass to a chattel or a
conversion, if such actions are necessary to, or are reasonably believed to be necessary to avoid “a public
disaster.” RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 196, 262; see id. § 196 cmt. a (identifying “a
conflagration, flood, earthquake, or pestilence” as examples of a “public disaster”). See, e.g.,
Commonwealth v. Capitolo, 471 A.2d 462, 480 (Pa. Super. 1984) (noting that the harms alleged—“that at
any given moment the Shippingport Plant may break down and another Three Mile Island incident ensue,
and that radiation from the plant is causing cancer and poisoning the reservoir—are comparable to the
harms caused by ‘conflagration, flood, earthquake, or pestilence,’” and “[t]hus met the ‘public disaster’
requirement of the Restatement”), rev’d on other grounds, 508 A.2d 372 (1985).
Presumably, the legal standard for catastrophic harm would consider both the scope and extent of
possible harm. In addition, the framing of the harm could affect the extent to which the harm is seen as
catastrophic. Cf. Daryl J. Levinson, Framing Transactions in Constitutional Law, 111 YALE L.J. 1311
(2002) (arguing that the frames through which matters are seen has an effect upon the legal outcome);
Robert V. Percival, “Greening” the Constitution—Harmonizing Environmental and Constitutional Values,
32 ENVTL. L. 809, 859-60 (2002) (critiquing extant standing doctrine on the ground that, by focusing on
individualized injury, it erroneously omits the broader impact of environmental regulatory regimes). In
particular, the loss of any one thing could be seen as catastrophic if the thing in question is viewed in
isolation. Takings jurisprudence solves the analogous problem of “conceptual severance,” see Margaret
Jane Radin, The Liberal Conception of Property: Cross Currents in the Jurisprudence of Takings, 88
Colum. L. Rev. 1667, 1676 (1988), by viewing property on a broader scale and generally rejecting narrow
framings of property rights, see, e.g., Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Regional Planning
Agency, 535 U.S. 302, 331 (2002). Similarly, the legal inquiry into whether harm is catastrophic should
require that the harm in question have effect on an objectively broad scale.
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courts.73 On the other hand, precautionary-based standing asks courts to examine
scientific evidence only, in effect, to determine whether the question of injury has been
sufficiently “put at issue” by that evidence, a task to which courts would seem equally, if
not better, suited.
B. Consistency of Precautionary-Based Standing with Existing Standing Doctrine
In this Section, I consider whether precautionary-based standing is consistent with
existing law. I first highlight applications of precaution under American law to
demonstrate that the importation of the precautionary principle to the law of standing has
precedent in American jurisprudence. I then turn to the particular question of whether the
proposal for precautionary-based standing is consistent with standing jurisprudence. I
consider the proposal’s fidelity to the policies underlying standing and also the proposal’s
consistency with the strictures of Article III.
To begin, the incorporation of the precautionary principle is foreign neither to
domestic law, nor indeed to the law of standing. The Supreme Court has fashioned
numerous “prophylactic rules”74 that are not called for by the language of the
Constitution but are designed to minimize the chances that constitutional violations will
in fact occur.75 Further, the precautionary principle can be said to undergird the
American approach to criminal law. In addition to the criminal law’s various
prophylactic rules, “[t]he presumption of innocence, the right to remain silent, the right to
a public trial by an impartial jury, and the requirement that the prosecutor must prove
each case beyond a reasonable doubt all reinforce the public’s perception that the
criminal justice system operates under the precautionary principle announced by
Blackstone more than two hundred years ago: ‘better that ten guilty persons escape than
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See, e.g., FPC v. Fla. Power & Light Co., 404 U.S. 453, 463 (1972) (“Particularly when we consider a
purely factual question within the area of competence of an administrative agency created by Congress, and
when resolution of that question depends on ‘engineering and scientific’ considerations, we recognize the
relevant agency’s technical expertise and experience, and defer to its analysis unless it is without
substantial basis in fact.”); NRDC v. U.S. EPA, 16 F.3d 1395, 1401 (4th Cir. 1993) (“[I]n reviewing EPA’s
actions . . . , this court does not sit as a scientific body, meticulously reviewing all data under a laboratory
microscope.”).
74
See generally David A. Strauss, The Ubiquity of Prophylactic Rules, 55 U. CHI. L. REV. 190 (1988).
75
See Brian K. Landsberg, Safeguarding Constitutional Rights: The Uses and Limits of Prophylactic
Rules, 66 TENN. L. REV. 925, 926 (1999) (defining “prophylactic rules” to mean “those risk-avoidance
rules that are not directly sanctioned or required by the Constitution, but that are adopted to ensure that the
government follows constitutionally sanctioned or required rules”); Joseph D. Grano, Prophylactic Rules in
Criminal Procedure: A Question of Article III Legitimacy, 80 NW. U. L. REV. 100, 105 (1985) (defining a
“prophylactic constitutional rule” as “a rule that functions as a preventive safeguard to insure that
constitutional violations will not occur”); WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 1818
(1986) (defining “prophylactic” as “preventing or contributing to the prevention of disease” or “tending to
prevent or ward off: preventative, cautionary”); see also Evan H. Caminker, Miranda and Some Puzzles of
“Prophylactic” Rules, 70 U. CIN. L. REV. 1, 2, (2001) (“[B]ecause courts frequently cannot determine with
much certainty whether or not a constitutional violation has occurred in a given case, and yet courts are
charged with trying to protect against constitutional violations, it is sometimes entirely appropriate for the
Supreme Court to develop prophylactic rules safeguarding constitutional rights.”).
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that one innocent suffer.’”76 The First Amendment directs that government—and
courts—take a cautionary view toward regulation of speech.77 For example, the doctrine
of prior restraints imposes a heavy presumption against attempts to regulate speech
before it in fact occurs.78 Indeed, the Court has explained, in language quite reminiscent
of the precautionary principle, that the justification for the doctrine of prior restraints is
that, as compared to punishment after the fact, “[a] prior restraint, . . . by definition, has
an immediate and irreversible sanction. If it can be said that a threat of criminal or civil
sanctions after publication ‘chills’ speech, prior restraint ‘freezes’ it at least for the
time.”79 While these areas of law generally take a precautionary view against
government regulation (as opposed to environmental law’s precautionary principle,
which generally takes a precautionary view against the absence of government
regulation), the reliance upon a precautionary approach remains.
There are several procedural devices that also adopt a precautionary approach. In
determining whether to grant preliminary injunctions and temporary restraining orders,
courts are directed to weigh, among other things, the irreparable harm to the defendant if
the injunction issues against the irreparable harm to the plaintiff if the injunction does not
issue.80 In criminal procedure (and in a reverse of the usual precautionary approach in
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Peter A. Joy, The Relationship between Prosecutorial Misconduct and Wrongful Convictions:
Shaping Remedies for a Broken System, 2006 WIS. L. REV. 399, 404-05 (footnotes omitted; quoting
WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, 4 COMMENTARIES *358.)). One also might consider the rule of lenity and the
requirement of a unanimous jury verdict in this regard.
77
See, e.g., MATTHEW D. BUNKER, CRITIQUING FREE SPEECH: FIRST AMENDMENT THEORY AND THE
CHALLENGE OF INTERDISCIPLINARITY 2, 8 (2001) (The practice of freedom of speech and of the press in the
U.S. “leads us to exercise great caution before silencing viewpoints with which we disagree.”); cf. Stuart
Minor Benjamin, Proactive Legislation and the First Amendment, 99 MICH. L. REV. 281, 326 n.158 (2000)
(“The very uncertainty that leads courts and commentators to err on the side of safety (i.e., environmental
protection) should similarly lead us, in the First Amendment context, to err on the side of protecting speech
interests.”).
78
See, e.g., New York Times. Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 714 (1971); KEITH WERHAN,
FREEDOM OF SPEECH: A REFERENCE GUIDE TO THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 141 (2004).
79
Nebraska Press Ass’n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 559 (1976).
The doctrine of prior restraints bears a feature in common with standing. Just because the doctrine of
prior restraints dictates that speech must be allowed to go forward, that does not mean that the speech will
ultimately be found to be protected by the First Amendment, and thus that the speaker will emerge
unpunished. In other words, the applicability of the doctrine of prior restraints does not speak to the
ultimate question of whether the First Amendment applies to the speech in question. Similarly, simply
because a court decides that a party has standing to litigate an issue does not speak to the ultimate success
with which the plaintiff will meet on the merits. See supra the text accompanying notes 63-64.
80
See, e.g., Amer. Hosp. Supply Corp. v. Hosp. Prods. Ltd., 780 F.2d 589, 593 (7th Cir. 1986); see also
Sunstein, supra note 10, at 866-69 (discussing preliminary injunctions in environmental cases in the
context of the irreversible harm precautionary principle). For an argument that courts should take their own
uncertainty as to final outcome into account in fashioning injunctive relief, see Joshua P. Davis, Taking
Uncertainty Seriously: Revising Injunction Doctrine, 34 RUTGERS L.J. 363 (2003).
In a recent Essay, Professor Lichtman critiques traditional preliminary injunction analysis for assessing
irreparable harm while ignoring the counterpart “irreparable benefits.” See Douglas Lichtman, Irreparable
Benefits, 116 YALE L.J. 1284 (2007). Putting Professor Lichtman’s observation in precautionary terms,
traditional preliminary injunction analysis takes a precautionary approach to harms that may result in the
event that an injunction issues or does not issue. His argument that benefits may also result both from the
issuance of an injunction and from the failure of an injunction to issue translates to the point that an
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criminal law that militates against government action), bail requirements guard against
the risk of irreparable harm that would result if the defendant were to flee the jurisdiction
and avoid trial. And, at the appeals stage, the “collateral order doctrine” provides an
exception to the usual rule in federal court that appeals may only be had once a final
order has been entered in cases where the occasion of a delayed appeal might itself
constitute an irreparable harm.81
The rules governing preliminary injunctions, interlocutory appeals, and bail
requirements are all directed against the possibility of some sort of irreversible harm, the
occurrence of which may be uncertain.82 Importantly, they also share in common another
characteristic: They all resolve matters preliminarily but without, by that resolution,
prejudicing the ultimate outcome on the merits. That is true of standing as well: The use
of precautionary-based standing would neither predetermine an outcome on the merits,
nor even mandate that the precautionary principle would be used to determine the
merits.83 Thus, the application of the precautionary principle in other “preliminary”
procedural doctrines strongly suggests that it would be at home as well in standing
jurisprudence.
In fact, standing jurisprudence itself is already a home to special rules that are
premised upon precaution. First, while the ordinary rule in standing is that one does not
have standing to raise the rights of others, a special rule applies in First Amendment
cases.84 Overbreadth doctrine allows parties to raise objections to speech regulations that
are overbroad, even if the regulations do not by their terms reach the parties’ speech. In
effect, then, overbreadth doctrine recognizes the standing of parties to raise other parties’
claims in First Amendment cases.85 The justification for this special rule is the concern
that overbroad speech restrictions might chill constitutionally protected speech, to the
detriment of all.86 Thus can a precautionary approach justify an appropriate limited
expansion of standing doctrine, much as would the proposal here.
approach that is pervasively precautionary will often identify large risks on both sides of a possible action,
and may thus often result in inherent contradiction. See supra the text accompanying notes 24-25.
81
See, e.g., Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 546 (1949) (approving of an
interlocutory appeal despite statutory language authorizing only appeals of final judgments on the ground
that, after a final order was entered, “it [would] be too late effectively to review the present order and the
rights conferred by the [state] statute [calling for the posting of a bond by the plaintiff], if it is applicable,
will have been lost, probably irreparably”); Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 331 n.11 (1976) (noting
“the core principle that statutorily created finality requirements should, if possible, be construed so as not to
cause crucial collateral claims to be lost and potentially irreparable injuries to be suffered”).
82
The same may be said, as I explain below, of standing in declaratory judgment actions. See infra the
text accompanying notes 87-90.
83
See supra the text accompanying notes 63-64. The same can be said of the applicability of the
doctrine of prior restraints as compared to the ultimate question of the applicability of the First Amendment
to the speech in question. See supra note 79.
84
See generally WERHAN, supra note 78, at 144-45; Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Making Sense of
Overbreadth, 100 YALE L.J. 853, 898-90 (1991); Michael C. Dorf, Facial Challenges to State and Federal
Statutes, 46 STAN. L. REV. 235, 263-64 (1994). But see Henry Paul Monaghan, Overbreadth, 1981 S. CT.
REV. 1, 21-30 (arguing that the standing rules that apply in First Amendment overbreadth cases are not
special).
85
See, e.g. Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U.S. 518, 521 (1972).
86
See id.
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A second special standing rule that is premised upon precaution is the notion of
standing in declaratory judgment actions. The Declaratory Judgment Act permits federal
courts to “declare the rights and other legal relations of any interested party seeking such
declaration, whether or not further relief is or could be sought.”87 Professor Borchard’s
justification for declaratory judgments rested on the ground that a “prospective victim”
ought not to be told “that the only way to determine whether the suspect is a mushroom
or a toadstool is to eat it.”88 Just this past Term, the Supreme Court underscored the
precautionary anchor of the Act by recognizing as a basic proposition that,
where threatened action by government is concerned, we do not require a plaintiff to expose
himself to liability before bringing suit to challenge the basis for the threat . . . . The plaintiff’s
own action (or inaction) in failing to violate the law eliminates the imminent threat of
prosecution, but nonetheless does not eliminate Article III jurisdiction.89

The Court then affirmed that the same reasoning applies “to situations in which the
plaintiff's self-avoidance of imminent injury is coerced by threatened enforcement action
of a private party rather than the government.”90
Having established that precaution is not foreign to standing jurisprudence, I turn
to the specific question of whether precautionary-based standing is consistent with
existing standing doctrine. As an initial matter, the precautionary-based standing
proposal (whether in its basic form, or as further limited to state sovereigns) would not
undermine the purposes underlying the doctrine of standing. First, there is little doubt
that there would be true disputation of issues with a live adversarial process in a case in
which precautionary-based standing would be found. To whatever extent that the
uncertainty with which any risks in such a case may reduce a party’s incentive to litigate
the matter with zeal, that would be outweighed by the fact that the harms in the case
would also have to be shown to be irreversible and catastrophic.
Second, though it would expand standing to a few more cases where it might not
exist under existing doctrine, precautionary-based standing would not throw open the
floodgates of litigation—especially if access to it is restricted to states in their sovereign
capacity. Thus, standing would continue to function, as Professor Stearns argues, to
frustrate attempts by private litigants to manipulate courts’ dockets and thus to take
advantage of the path-dependence of law.91 Nor, moreover, would this slight expansion
of standing undermine the role that, as Professor Kontorovich has argued, standing serves
to preserve private parties’ rights to negotiate around, rather than assert, their rights
(which, he in any event argues, applies in the constitutional setting).92 And, to the extent
that, as Professor Carlson has argued, existing standing doctrine in the long run aids
environmentalists by forcing them to relate environmental problems to human beings and
87

28 U.S.C. § 2201(a) (2006).
Edwin M. Borchard, The Constitutionality of Declaratory Judgments, 31 COLUM. L. REV. 561, 589
(1931).
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MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., 127 S. Ct. 764, 772 (2007).
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Id. at 773; see id. at 773-74.
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See supra the text accompanying note 46.
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See supra the text accompanying note 47.
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institutions,93 precautionary-based standing would not alter the anthropocentricity of the
standing inquiry.
Moreover, while precautionary-based standing presumably would not displace,
and instead would coexist with, the political question doctrine, it seems that the doctrine
would be at low ebb in cases where precautionary-based standing is likely to apply.
Political economy predicts—and experience unfortunately often bears out94—that the
political branches are generally unlikely to respond ex ante to catastrophic risks. The
benefits of expenditures ex ante are less tangible and more uncertain than benefits
associated with government expenditures is general.95 As such, government actors are
comparatively unlikely to supply such expenditures. Public demand for ex ante planning
and expenditures is also likely to be muted. People often tend to undervalue the likely
occurrence of low-risk events, and a similar down-valuing may result from people’s
desire to avoid contemplating catastrophic events and damage.96 To the extent that the
political branches are thus less likely to confront possible catastrophic events, the notion
of relying upon standing to assure deference to those branches seems misplaced.
The question remains whether application of precautionary-based standing would
be consistent with Article III requirements for standing. One answer to this question is
that, as some have argued, the Court has been too stringent in its interpretation of Article
III in constructing the current “injury” component of standing.97 Under this view, while
precautionary-based standing may not be consistent with the current “injury”
jurisprudence, that jurisprudence calls for more than is required by the Constitution.
Precautionary-based standing can be seen, however, to be essentially consistent
with the Court’s current “injury” jurisprudence. To begin, the Court’s recognition of
93

See Ann E. Carlson, Standing for the Environment, 45 UCLA L. REV. 931 (1998) (arguing that
standing rules may force environmental advocates to rethink environmental problems and express them in
terms of how they may affect human beings, and that the resulting refocusing of environmental advocacy
would benefit courts, the public, and ultimately the environment).
94
See generally William F. Shughart II, Katrinanomics: The Politics and Economics of Disaster Relief,
127 PUBLIC CHOICE 31 (2006).
95
See Ben Depoorter, Horizontal Political Externalities: The Supply and Demand of Disaster
Management, 56 DUKE L.J. 101, 111 (2006).
One might argue that the absence of public demand for the government to address potential disasters,
see generally Ann E. Carlson, Heat Waves, Global Warming & Mitigation, in CATASTROPHIC RISKS:
PREVENTION, COMPENSATION, AND RECOVERY (forthcoming 2007) (SSRN paper # 998899) (explaining
why the public does not demand government action to mitigate heat waves), bolsters the case that such a
question is a matter of policy that should be committed to the political branches. At the same time, the
salient aspect of the “absence of public demand” is that groups that demand action are not powerful enough
to effect political action, meaning that policymakers are not encouraged to undertake action. See id.;
Depoorter, supra, at 111. Thus, the point remains that the political branches are suboptimally unlikely to
take action, which in turns makes judicial intervention more appropriate.
96
See Depoorter, supra note 95, at 121-22; see also Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, The Psychology of Global
Climate Change, 2000 U. ILL. L. REV. 299, 303-313.
97
See, e.g., David M. Driesen, Standing for Nothing: The Paradox of Demanding Concrete Context for
Formalist Adjudication, 89 CORNELL L. REV. 808 (2004); Percival, supra at 859-60; Michael Herz, The
Rehnquist Court and Administrative Law, 99 NW. U. L. REV. 297, 348-54 (2004) (criticizing the Court’s
standing jurisprudence as result-oriented and as asymmetrically biased in favor of regulated entities and
against regulatory beneficiaries).
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standing to issue declaratory judgments98 suggests that Article III tolerates some
attenuation between an injury and a possible victim.
Further, in particular, the fact that uncertainty surrounds an injury’s occurrence,
but also that the injury, if it occurs, would be catastrophic and irreversible, creates an
especially strong argument for an injury sufficient to satisfy Article III. Consider first
uncertainty. Professor Farber has advanced the view that the mere imposition of
uncertainty may sometimes itself rise to the level of injury sufficient to satisfy Article
III’s requirements. He explains that societal actors often take affirmative steps in the face
of uncertainty, and that indeed an entire industry—insurance—has arisen to allow actors
to mitigate uncertainty.99 Thus, he suggests, the presence of a market for insurance to
address an uncertainty should be used as a guide for whether standing grounded on that
uncertainty may exist.100
Next consider the catastrophic nature of injury.101 That an injury is catastrophic
means that, even if the odds that the injury will come to pass are small and the time
horizon large, the “expected value” of the injury will likely remain of great magnitude.
The requirement that, for standing to exist, there must be injury that is “actual” and
“imminent” is designed to ensure that litigants have a true incentive vigorously to pursue
their claims.102 Viewed economically, these factors can be understood to affect the value
of the injury, and thus the incentive of the litigants: The less “imminent” the injury, the
less valuable, thanks to discounting, the injury can be said to be. The same can be said as
the injury becomes less “actual”—i.e., more contingent. For garden variety injuries, a
remote, highly contingent injury is likely to be worth little, and thus to provide litigants
with little incentive to pursue a claim in relation thereto. This is because the ratio of the
“expected value” of the injury to the full value of the injury is substantially less than
one.103 The same cannot be said for potentially catastrophic injuries. In such cases,
98

See supra the text accompanying notes 87-90.
See Daniel A. Farber, Uncertainty as a Basis for Standing, 33 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1123 (2005).
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See id. at 1126-29.
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The Court has never held that the possibility of catastrophic damage may not form the basis of a
constitutionally sufficient injury, even if the damage is not traditionally concrete or imminent. See Duke
Power Co. v. Carolina Envtl. Study Group, Inc., 438 U.S. 59, 73 (1978) (“For purposes of the present
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See supra the text accompanying note 43.
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To see this mathematically, let I = the magnitude of the injury, p = the likelihood that the injury will
come to pass, r = the applicable discount rate, and t = the amount of time over which discounting is to
occur (i.e., the amount of time until the injury will occur if it in fact occurs). Then the expected value of
the injury is expressed as (pI)/(1 + r)t. Thus, the ratio of the expected value of the injury to the full value of
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imminent.)
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simple mathematical formulae. See Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 750, 751 (1984) (observing that “the
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while a low likelihood of the injury occurring and a longer time horizon will tend to
reduce the expected value of the injury,104 the enormity of the injury’s magnitude may
serve to offset this reduction such that the ratio between the injury’s expected value and
full value is not substantially less than one. Put another (if somewhat less precise) way, a
catastrophe is of such large magnitude and scope that one percent of it standing alone is
still a catastrophe.105
The combination of catastrophic and irreversible injury the likely occurrence of
which is uncertain puts the argument for standing at its apex. Even if a low probability of
a catastrophic, irreversible harm is not generally sufficient to meet Article III’s
requirements, the fact that a catastrophic, irreversible harm’s likelihood of occurring is
definition”); ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION 68 (4th ed. 2003) (explaining that “no formula
exists for determining what types of injuries are adequate to allow a plaintiff standing to sue in federal
court”). Compare Amer. Hosp. Supply Corp. v. Hosp. Prods. Ltd., 780 F.2d 589, 593 (7th Cir. 1986)
(Posner, J.) (developing a formula to describe dispositions of preliminary injunction requests) with Linda J.
Silberman, Injunctions by the Numbers: Less than the Sum of its Parts, 63 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 279 (1987)
(criticizing Judge Posner’s formula). For a general argument against reducing civil procedure to formulae,
see Linda S. Mullenix, Burying (with Kindness) the Felicific Calculus of Civil Procedure, 40 VAND. L.
REV. 541 (1987); see also id. at 579 (impliedly lamenting attempts to develop economic rationales for
standing doctrine).)
104
One might formulate an argument that militates against discounting catastrophic and irreversible
harm against an extended time horizon. Dean Revesz has argued, in the context of the treatment of the loss
of human lives under cost-benefit analysis, that the dread, and involuntary, nature of the result of exposure
to environmental hazards may justify discounting future harms at a discount rate less than the rate one
would use for simply financial obligations. See Richard L. Revesz, Environmental Regulation, CostBenefit Analysis, and the Discounting of Human Lives, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 941, 968-74 (1999); but see
Matthew D. Adler, Fear Assessment: Cost-Benefit Analysis and the Pricing of Fear and Anxiety, 79 CHI.KENT L. REV. 977, 1005 n.97 (2004) (noting that the suggestion of discounting at a lower rate because of
dread was considered and rejected by EPA’s Science Advisory Board “for lack of sufficient evidence about
the size of the fear premium”). Perhaps the dread nature of impending catastrophe, combined with the fact
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the context of standing. Cf. Albert C. Lin, The Unifying Role of Harm in Environmental Law, 2006 WIS. L.
REV. 897, 949 (“The latent hazards characteristic of environmental problems are dreaded not only because
of their involuntary nature, catastrophic potential, and fatal consequences, but also because they often have
no clearly defined end.” (footnote omitted)).
Dean Revesz also has argued that the discounting of human lives is ethically unjustified where the harm
will occur so far in the future that it will affect future generations. See Revesz, supra, at 989-1007. Once
again, perhaps catastrophic harm that will affect future generations similarly ought not to be discounted in
the standing analysis.
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Following the mathematical notations supra in footnote 103, if the probability of an injury occurring
is especially small and/or the time until the injury occurs is large, then will be a small number, i.e., a
fraction with a numerator of 1 and a very large denominator. If the injury is catastrophic, then the injury I,
which falls in the numerator of the expected value formula, will also be very large. Mathematically, the
quotient of a very large number divided by another very large number may either be very small, very large,
or anything in between. For example, the limit, as n goes to infinity, of n/n2 is 0, the limit of n/n is 1, and
the limit of n2/n is infinity. The last example is one in which the magnitude of the numerator compared to
the denominator is so large (even they both the numerator and denominator standing alone are themselves
large) that the division by the denominator has no reductive effect as the limit approaches infinity.
Interpreting this example in light of the expected value formula, this a situation in which the injury is so
catastrophic that even a low probability of occurrence and substantial time horizon do not meaningfully
reduce the catastrophic impact of the expected value. Loosely speaking, a fraction of a catastrophe (with
damage approaching infinity) may still be catastrophic (and itself still be infinite).
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uncertain means that one cannot confidently state that the expected value of the injury is
so low that Article III will not be satisfied. On this basis, then, precautionary-based
standing ought to meet Article III’s strictures.
A final objection to Article III compatibility with the application of
precautionary-based standing is that, insofar as catastrophic harm is broad in scope, the
harm might be said to be “generalized” in many cases in which precautionary standing
might be invoked. The policy reasons I discussed above, however, demonstrate why the
usual justification for not allowing standing with respect to generalized harms—that
generalized harms are best left to the political branches rather than judicial
determination—are not persuasive in the context of catastrophic harms.106 Moreover, to
the extent that the bar against assertion of generalized harms is compelled by Article
III,107 the restriction of precautionary-based standing to states would presumably allow
the states to elaborate upon the potential for catastrophic harm that would be less likely to
be generalized (even among prospective plaintiff states).
C. The Normative Desirability of Precautionary-Based Standing
Having established that precautionary-based standing can be implemented and
would not be inconsistent with existing standing doctrine or its underpinnings, I turn to
the question of whether it is a good idea to implement the proposal. I argue that
precautionary-based standing is normatively desirable for several ways.
First, consider the Massachusetts case itself. Many commentators have criticized
the Court’s opinion for improperly weighing in on scientific evidence, and for thus
intruding upon questions that are inherently policy-based and political in nature. The
Court would have avoided criticisms of this sort had it embraced precautionary-based
standing. Reliance upon precaution also would have garnered support for the Court’s
holding on standing among people who question the strength of scientific evidence
establishing global warming, yet who recognize that global warming poses the possibility
of extreme harm in the event that some predictions are accurate.
Invocation of precautionary-based standing would have lessened the need for the
Court to draw strong conclusions about the science of global warming. Some have
expressed concern that the Court’s holding on standing leaves the EPA little room on
remand to address scientific questions.108 While the Court may ultimately be right on the
scientific issues, the use of precautionary-based standing would have afforded the Court
106

See supra notes 94-96 and accompanying text.
The exception for taxpayer challenges to congressional expenditures under the Establishment Clause
draws this at least somewhat into question. See Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83 (1968) (announcing
availability of standing in such cases); compare Hein v. Freedom from Religion Found., Inc., 127 S. Ct.
2553, 2565-68 (2007) (opinion per Alito, J.) (recognizing the continued vitality of Flast, but holding that
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wider berth in avoiding the heart of the scientific controversy, in keeping with the general
restraint of courts on such matters.109
Second, consider the import of precautionary-based standing for environmental
problems in the future. In this regard, even those who fully support the Court’s holding
in Massachusetts may feel the majority missed an important opportunity to integrate
precaution into the standing inquiry. It may well be that there is now adequate scientific
consensus to justify action now, but that was not always the case. On this understanding,
the absence of precautionary-based standing has already delayed a response to global
warming.110 There likely are other environmental problems lurking down the line where,
again, the timing of a response may be of the essence. To the extent that precautionarybased standing at least forces government to address problems at an earlier juncture, its
availability is likely to be of recurring importance.
Third, there is in theory no reason why precautionary-based standing needs to be
limited to cases raising environmental problems. For example, commentators have
argued in favor of extending standing to more cases that raise allegations of stigmatic
harm.111 And stigmatic harm, like some environmental harm, might at least sometimes
and in some ways be characterized as irreversible and catastrophic.112 Perhaps
experience with precautionary-based standing in the environmental context will
ultimately convince courts to extend its reach to other areas.
I realize that there is some degree of inconsistency in arguing, as I have, on the
one hand that precautionary-based standing is consistent with existing standing doctrine
in part because it is so limited,113 and on the other hand that precautionary-based standing
might be desirable because it might eventually be used as a vehicle to expand standing on
a broader scale. While the points may be somewhat inconsistent, however, they are not
incompatible. The introduction of precautionary-based standing in environmental cases
would be a very limited step. And, it may well be that experience shows that it should
not be extended to other areas. Certainly, the Court has been circumspect about
extending overbreadth doctrine beyond First Amendment cases, emphasizing that the
doctrine constitutes “strong medicine.”114 And it may well be that that attitude should
apply as well to precautionary-based standing, in that courts should be reticent to invoke
it except in appropriate cases. On the other hand, experience may show that the
precautionary-based standing provides a valid basis for the evolution of standing doctrine
on a broader scale.
That brings us to a fourth normative justification for introducing precautionarybased standing. Development and implementation of the precautionary principle has
109
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lagged, not in small part because of uncertainty as to exactly what the principle means.115
In some sense, there is a vicious cycle: The absence of development in the principle’s
meaning deters others from implementing the principle, which in turn feeds the absence
of development in the principle’s meaning. The introduction of the principle into
standing would be a progressive step at explicitly establishing the principle in American
jurisprudence and then at eliciting judicial interpretations of the principle. Those
interpretations, in turn, may provide a base upon which further development and
expansion of the principle might take place. Although scholars have produced thoughtful
and useful analyses of the precautionary principle, nothing can truly substitute for
ensconcing the principle in the law and having the principle scrutinized and fleshed out
by courts. As Professor Geistfeld has explained:
The vagueness of the precautionary principle suggests that its development and
implementation will proceed in stages. Initially, implementation is likely to involve the least
controversial aspects of the principle. If these minimal requirements of the principle can be
turned into a regulatory decision rule, the rule would at least partially satisfy most proponents
of the precautionary principle. Disagreements about other aspects of the principle can then be
framed in terms of alterations to the regulatory decision rule.116

Thus may the introduction of precautionary-based standing facilitate the development and
spread of the precautionary principle in other contexts.
V.

CONCLUSION

In this Essay, I have argued that the Supreme Court in Massachusetts v. EPA
missed an opportunity to recognize precautionary-based standing. Precautionary-based
standing would enable courts to hear cases where it can be shown that harm that might
result would be catastrophic and irreversible, and that the likelihood of such harm coming
to pass is subject to great uncertainty. Reliance on precautionary-based standing would
have garnered greater support for the Court’s decision in the Massachusetts case.
The use of precautionary-based standing would have a very limited impact on
existing standing doctrine. At the same time, the introduction of precautionary-based
standing would provide two long-term benefits. First, even though the mere introduction
of precautionary-based standing would be limited, it would provide a model for broader
relaxation of standing requirements, were that to be deemed to be desirable. More
importantly, the introduction of precautionary-based standing would ensconce the
precautionary principle in the legal system. The courts, over time, would generate over
time judicial interpretations of the precautionary principle, which in turn could be used to
further applications of the principle in areas beyond standing.
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